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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
vs. Case No. 15169 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a claim for refund brought by the plaintiff-
respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation, against defendant-
appellant, Salt Lake County, to recover ad valorem property 
taxes paid to Salt Lake County under protest for the year 1976. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
Plaintiff-respondent filed an alternative motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings or Summary Judgment with regard 
to its First Cause of Action. 
Defendant-appellant filed an alternative motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings or Summary Judgment with regard to 
plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action. The Court 
denied defendant's Motions and took plaintiff's alternative 
Motion under advisement. Plaintiff and defendant submitted 
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legal memoranda to the Court. The Court issued its memoranaur 
decision granting plaintiff a Summary Judgment. The trial 
court ruled that Salt Lake County under the facts as presem~, 
was without legal authority to re-set its mill levy after t~ 
date prescribed by statute. By denying defendant's Motions, 
the Court also ruled that the previous decision of the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in Salt Lake City Corporation et.!!_ 
v. Salt Lake County, case no. 14776 decided October 7, 1977, 
in which Kennecott Copper Corporation was a plaintiff and S~t 
Lake County the defendant, had no binding affect upon the 
instant action and was not therefore res judicata. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment 
of the trial court and further requests that this Court enter 
an order determining: 
( 1) that defendant-appellant, Salt Lake County, had 
the authority to adopt the mill levy as finally adopted and 
subsequently approved by the State Tax Commission of Utah and 
utilized for the year 1976; and 
(2) that the issues presented by the Complaint of 
plaintiff-respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation, have previou 
been decided by the Supreme Court in Salt Lake City Corporatioo, 
et al., v. Salt Lake County, case no. 14776, in which Kennec~t 
Copper Corporation appears as a named plaintiff, and that Kenne,: 
Copper Corporation is therefore barred and precluded from 
re-litigating the same issues in a subsequent case against the 
same defendant. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 9, 1976 the Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners set the general Salt Lake County property tax 
levy at 14.42 mills. 
On September 20, 1976 the Salt Lake County Board 
of Commissioners re-set the mill levy thereby adopting a 
general property tax mill levy of 16 mills. The 16 mill 
levy was approved by the State Tax Commission of Utah. 
On the 24th day of September, 1976, plaintiff-
respondent Kennecott Copper Corporation, in conjunction 
with other named plaintiffs, filed an original action in the 
Utah Supreme Court against Salt Lake County entitled 
"Petition and Motion for an Extraordinary Writ," Case 
No. 14776. (T-39-47) Included in Count I of plaintiff-
respondent's petition were the following allegations: 
"7. On May 28, 1976, this Court in the case of 
Salt Lake City Corporation et al. v. Salt Lake 
County et al., 550 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1976) deter-
mined that where a Utah County of the first 
class decides to provede certain municipal 
type services to unincorporated areas of that 
county they must do so in accordance with 
the terms of the Municipal Type Services to 
Unincorporated Areas Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 17-34-1 et seq., 1953 as amended. A 
copy of said decision is attached hereto as 
Exhibit 'A' and by this reference made a part 
hereof. Said decision states as follows: 
'This is an equitable enabling statute per-
mitting counties to provide equal services 
to the unincorporated areas of the county. 
But where the county elects to provide such 
-3-
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services the statute says it is to defray the 
costs by either one of two methods: (12 by 
levying taxes on taxable property in the 
unincorporated areas of the county receiving 
the service; or (2) by imposign a service 
charge pr fee to persons benefited by such 
services. 
Where the county chooses to follow the first 
part of the statute (providing services) the 
second part of the statute must be followed. 
The extent by which the costs would be defrayed 
by the two methods would of course depend 
on all the cost thereof and all the surrounding 
circumstances. To hold that the county may 
provide services without attempting to collect 
money to defray the cost would serve as an 
unjust burden upon the city residents and be 
contrary to the clear statutory language.' 
Said decision remanded the aforesaid case to the 
District Court 'with directions to enjoin the 
furnishing of all municipal services (except 
fire fighting services) to unincorporated areas 
of the county until the respondents comply 
with the provision of Section 17-34-1, U.C.A. 
1953, Replacement Volume 2B'." 
11 17. Respondents have continued providing 
the services of street lighting, planning and 
zoning, and garbage and refuse collection and 
disposal to the unincorporated areas of the county 
since the date of this Court's decision mandating 
that such be discontinued until such time as 
Salt Lake County complies with the terms of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 17-34-1 et seq., 1953 
as amended." 
"20. Respondents actions in continuing to provide 
the aforesaid services without complying with 
this Court's decision in Salt Lake City Coroora-
tion v. Salt Lake County, supra, and without 
complying with the terms of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 17-34-3, 1953 as amended, and in raising 
the general mill levy on September 20, 1976, so 
as to be able to continue to provide aforesaid 
services with general fund revenues constitutes 
a direct defiance, and blatant disregard, of 
this Court and of the legislature of the State 
-4-
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of Utah. Said actions are illegal, null and 
void, ultra vires and without any legal authority." 
Paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of said petition alleged as 
follows: 
11 22. Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-9-6.3, 
59-9-8, 17-36-31, 1953, as amended, require 
the Salt Lake County Board of County Commissioners 
to set the mill levy for the tax year in question 
on or before the second Monday in August. -
These provisions are as follows: 
'The board of county commissioners of each 
county must levy a tax on the taxable property 
of the county between the last Monday ~n 
the seventh month of each fiscal year and 
the second Monday in the eighth month of each 
fiscal year to provide funds for county pur-
poses including but not limited to the 
following: 
(1) For general county purposes; 
(2) For the care, maintenance and relief 
of indigent sice and otherwise depen-
dent poor; 
(3) For the construction, improvement and 
maintenance of county roads; 
(4) For all other purposes authorized by law. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-6.3, 1953 as amended. 
The governing body of each city and town, 
and each board of county commissioners, must 
file a statement with the state tax commission, 
on or before the second Monday in August 
of each year, showing the amount and purpose 
of each levy fixed by such governing body and 
board. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-9-8, 1953 as amended. 
On or before the second Monday in August 
of each year, the governing body shall levy 
a tax on the taxable real property and 
personal property within the county. In its 
computation of the total levy subject to 
sections 59-9-6.5, it shall determine the 
requirements for each fund and specify the 
number of mills apportioned to each fund. 
-5-
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The proceeds of the tax apportioned for 
purposes of the general fund shall be credited 
in the general fund. 
The proceeds of the tax apportioned for 
utility and other special fund purposes shall 
be credited to the appropriate accounts in 
the utility or other special funds.' 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-36-31, 1953 as amended." 
"2 3. As above set forth in Salt Lake County 
Commission on September 20, 1976, attempted 
to reset the general property tax mill levy 
applicable to all taxable real property in 
Salt Lake County from 14.42 mills to 16 mills." 
"24. The attempted resetting of the general 
mill levy on September 20, 1976, after the 
statutorily required setting on or before the 
second Monday in August, is without legal 
authority, null, void, ultra vires and with-
out any force and effect." 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of plaintiff-respondent's 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ contained the following 
request for relief: 
"2. That such extraordinary Writ prohibit 
Respondents from assessing, collecting or 
proceeding to assess and collect 1.58 mills 
of the general Salt Lake County property 
tax mill levy; said 1.58 mills representing 
the difference between the 16 mill levy set 
by the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners 
on September 20, 1976 and the 14.42 mill 
levy set by said Board on August 9, 19 76." 
"3. That this Court declare the mill levy 
of September 20, 1976, above set forth to 
be illegal, ultra vires, accomplished with-
out authority, beyond the purview of the law, 
and of no force and effect." 
"4. That Respondents be restrained, enjoined 
and prohibited from assessing, collecting, 
or proceeding any further to assess and 
collect 1.58 mills of the general Salt Lake 
-6-
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County property tax mill levy pending a 
hearing and that such restraint, injunction 
and probhibition be made permanent upon hearing." 
On October 7, 1976, this Court issued its written 
decision in that case. (T-38) 
Thereafter, on the 7th day of December, 1976, 
Kennecott Copper Corporation, as plaintiff, filed a 
Complaint against Salt Lake County in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County. (T-2-16) 
Plaintiff-respondent's Complaint including its 
First and Second Causes of Action contains allegations 
substantially the same as the allegations of the Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief, decided by the Utah Supreme Court on 
October 7, 1976, case No. 14776. In the Petition for Extra-
ordinary Relief, plaintiff sought injunctive relief. In 
plaintiff's second lawsuit, plaintiff sought refund of taxes 
paid under protest. The legal and factual issues presented 
by both actions are identical. Defendant-appellant Salt Lake 
County, in response to plaintiff-respondent's second lawsuit, 
filed its Answer. (T-20-23) 
Amo~ the affirmative defenses asserted by defendant-
respondent were the defenses of Res Judicata and Collateral 
Estoppel. These defenses were based upon the fact that the 
Utah Supreme Court, in case No. 14776, had previously decided 
the same issues and resolved the same requests for relief 
between the plaintiff-respondent Kennecott Copper Corporation 
and defendant-appellant Salt Lake County. 
-7-
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Plaintiff-respondent Kennecott Copper Corporation 
thereafter moved alternatively for judgment on the pleadings 
or for summary judgment with regard to its First Cause of 
Action. (T-25-28) 
Defendant-appellant Salt Lake County moved 
alternatively for judgment on the pleadings or for sununary 
judgment with regard to the First and Second Causes of 
Action by the plaintiff. (T-33-48) 
Defendant-appellant's motions were denied. (T-49) 
Plaintiff- respondent's motion was taken under 
advisement with each party supplying the Court with legal 
memoranda. (T-50-62) and T-63-72) 
On April 4, 1977, the Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision granting plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. (T-73-76) Defendant-appellant Salt Lake County 
appealed. (T-85) In its Memorandum Decision, the Court 
reasoned and found as follows: 
"In this case the Court finds that Salt Lake 
County, on August 9 1976, set the Mill Levy 
for taxation at 14.42 mills. Thereafter, on 
September 20, 1976, the County by a new resolu-
tion changed the Mill Levy to 16 mills. 
The issue to be decided by the Court is 
whether or not the imposition of a mill levy of 
16 mills, voted upon by the Salt Lake County 
Commission September 20, 1976, is lawful. 
Utah Code Annotated 59-9-6.3 requires the 
Board of County Commissioners of each County 
in the State of Utah levying an ad valorem 
property tax to fix the mill levy between the 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dates of the last Monday of July of each 
year, and the second Monday of August of 
each year. The applicable provision of 
59-9-6.3 reads as follows: 
'The Board of County Commissioners of each 
County must levy a tax on the taxable property 
of the County between the last Monday in the 
seventh month of each fiscal year, and the 
second Monday in the eighth month of each 
fiscal year, to provide funds for County 
purposes ••• ' 
The provision of 17-36-1 of the Utah Code 
Annotated also provides: 
'On or before the second Monday in August 
of each year, the governing body shall levy 
a tax on the taxable real and personal property 
in the County ••. ' 
In addition to the Sections already cited, 
the Court calls attantion to 59-9-8 which 
provides for: 
'The governing body of each city and town, 
and the said Board of County Commissioners, 
must file a statement with the State Tax 
Commission, on or before the second Monday in 
August of each year, showing the amount and 
the purpose of each levy fixed by such governing 
body and Board.' 
The Court finds that the words 'must' and 
'shall' as set forth in the 59-9-6.3 and 17-36-1 
are mandatory and not merely directory. 
Black's Law Dictionary in referring to the 
word 'must' says: 
'This word, like the word 'shall', is 
primarily a mandatory affect ••• ' 
An examination of the same word in 'Words and 
Phrases' shows that generally speaking the use 
of the word 'must' is mandatory, not merely 
directory. 
In view of the provisions of 59-9-8 it seems 
that the Utah Legislature has consistently held 
to the levy being fixed by the second Monday in 
-9-
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August of each year. That provision has 
been in the Code since the laws of 1923. 
Section 59-9-6.3 was added to the law in 1961, 
and merely carries out the legislative intent. 
Defendants refer the Court to 59-11-7 which 
reads: 'No assessment, or act relating to 
assessment, or collection of taxes, is illegal 
on account of inofrmality, or because the 
same was not completed within the time required 
by law.' 
The Court finds that there is a distinction 
between the assessment and the levy of the 
tax. McQuillin on Municipal Cornoration, 
Section 44.92 states: 
'Levy and assessment are distinct processes, 
and, except wher·e otherwise provided by 
Statute, both are essential to taxation.' 
The Code citation above referred to relates 
to the 'assessment', whereas the first cita-
tions refer to the 'levy' of the tax. 
McQuillin on Municinal Corporations, Section 
44.93 says: 'Whatever preliminaries are by 
law made essential and mandatory, as 
distinguished from directory merely, to the 
levy of a tax, must be observed or the tax 
will be void.' 
The same authority at Section 44.95 states 
as follows: 'The time for making the levy is, 
in most jurisdictions, prescribed by statute 
or charter. Unless such provision is directory 
merely, the taxing authorities may not disregard 
a definite provision as to the time for the 
making of the levy, or as to when the amount 
of the tax is to be determined and certified. 
Generally, only one levy a year is authorized 
for the same purpose; but where no time is 
fixed for the levy the ordinance may be passed 
at any time'within the year.' 
'The applicable law governs as to the 
effective date of a levy, and as to the period 
covered thereby. It has been held that a 
municipality is authorized to levy taxes in 
-10-
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anticipation of demands that will arise in the 
future. A levy of taxes by a city during the 
year of its incorporation generally is authorized.' 
The Court recognizes the general rule on 
statutory construction of revenue legislation 
as set forth in Sutherland on Statutes and 
Statutory Construction, Section 6701. General 
Rule. 'While the power to tax, and the exercise 
of that power is indispensable to the effective 
operation of government, the rule has become 
firmly established that tax laws are to be 
strictly construed against the state and in 
favor of the taxpayer. Therefore, where there 
is reasonable doubt as to the meaning of a revenue 
statute it should be resolved in favor of 
those taxed.' 
For the foregoing reasons the Court grants 
the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and directs the plaintiff to prepare an 
appropriate order." 
-11-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANTtS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON 
THE PLEADINGS OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN DECIDED 
BY THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH AS AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF AND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT. 
In denying defendant's motions, the trial court 
completely ignored the fact that the same parties to this 
action had already litigated the same issues in the Utah 
Supreme Court. In so doing, the trial court failed to 
recognize the rule of res judicata by which a final judgment 
or decree on the merits is conclusive as to all points and 
matters determined in a former suit. The fact that the 
first action was initiated and decided in the Supreme Court 
does not alter the effect of the former adjudication. 
"The doctrine of res judicata applies as 
well to judgments of courts of last resort as 
to those of nisi prius courts; and a decision 
of an appellate court will preclude any further 
action on the same matter between the parties, 
provided the court acts within its jurisdiction." 
50 C.J.S. Judgments, Section 607 p. 30. 
Nor does the fact that plaintiff-respondent's 
first action in the Supreme Court involved extraordinary 
relief alter the effect: 
"It is well settled that the doctrine of 
res judicata is applicable to judgments 
in mandamus and prohibition proceedings, 
that is, the special character of these 
proceedings does not ipso facto, preclude 
-12-
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a judgment rendered therein from operating 
as res judicata in another action or 
proceedings." 21 A. L. R. 3d, Mandamus-
Prohibition-Res Judicata Section 2 at 
p. 213. 
The effect of the former adjudication involving the 
same issues, whether raised in an action for extraordinary 
relief or otherwise is, therefore, conclusive. 
"Many cases have dealt with the question as 
to the conclusive effect of a judgment in a 
mandamus or prohibition proceeding on issues 
raised in another action. As to issues 
actually determined by the judgment in the 
mandamus or prohibition proceeding, the judg-
ment is conclusive, thus precluding the parties 
from relitigating the same issues." 21 A.L.R. 
3d 206, Section 2 at p. 214. 
In its first lawsuit in the Supreme Court, Kennecott 
asserted that the defendant Salt Lake County was not complying 
with the Court's decision in Salt Lake City Corporation et al. 
v. Salt Lake County, et al., 550 P2d 1291 (Utah 1976) and 
Section 17-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and sought 
prohibition against Salt Lake County. In its second action 
in the District Court, Kennecott asserted that the defendant 
Salt Lake County was not complying with the Court's decision 
in Salt Lake City Corporation et al v. Salt Lake County et al., 
550 P2d 1291 (Utah 1976) and Section 17-34, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, and sought a refund for taxes paid under 
protest. 
In its first lawsuit in the Supreme Court of Utah, 
-13-
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plaintiff Kennecott alleged that the Salt Lake County mill 
levy for 1976 was illegal as being statutorily untimely and 
too late and sought prohibition of the subsequent levy. In 
the second lawsuit, plaintiff sought a refund for the excess 
between the mill levy initially adopted and the one subsequently 
adopted on the grounds it was statutorily untimely. 
Plaintiff's petition in the Supreme Court was denied 
as to both claims. Justice Henroid filed a written dissent 
from the majority opinion. Justice Crockett voted to deny 
plaintiff's petition on other grounds. 
The issues disposed of by the Supreme Court in the 
first lawsuit are the same as the ones presented in the 
second lawsuit filed by Kennecott. 
It is, therefore, submitted that under the doctrine 
of res judicata the issues determined in the former action 
are conclusively settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court 
and may not again be relitigated in the second action between 
Kennecott and Salt Lake County and that the trial judge erred 
in denying the defendant's alternative motions. See 21 A.L.R. J1 
305, Mandamus-Prohibition-Res Judicata, Section 9(b) p. 232. 
See also Restatement of Judgments, Section 48 and Tentative 
Draft No. 4 Restatement of the Law Second, Judgments, April 15, 
1977. 
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POINT II 
THE ACTION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IN RE-SETTING 
THE MILL LEVY AS FINALLY ADOPTED DID NOT 
NULLIFY THE LEVY AND THE DECISION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT IN SO RULING WAS ERRONEOUS. 
County tax levies are covered by Sections 59-9-6.1 
through 59-9-6.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 1961. 
Sections 59-9-6.1 sets out the legislative purpose 
for enacting the sections of the Code dealing with County levies. 
"Since it is difficult to provide a break 
down of mill levies for specific purposes 
on a state-wide basis due to the varying 
needs of individual counties, it is advise-
able and in the best interest of good county 
government that an over-all levy be provided 
for. This will allow the county legislative 
body to use county funds where needed and to 
improve budgetary procedures in accordance 
with the uniform accounting system passed 
by the 1957 legislature. It is the purpose 
of this bill to provide a maximum over-all 
mill levy for counties accordin to assessed 
value." emphasis supplied 
The purposes of this legislative scheme are three fold: 
(a) to allow county legislative bodies to use county 
funds where needed; 
(b) improve budgetary procedures in accordance with 
the uniform accounting system; and 
(c) provide a maximum over-all mill levy for counties 
according to assessed value. 
Section 59-9-6.2 implements in part the legislative 
purpose by setting the maximum mill levy. Sixteen mills are 
allowed for counties with a total assessed value of more than 
$20,000,000 and eighteen mills for counties with a total assessed 
value of less than $20,000,000. That Salt Lake County is entitled 
to levy 16 mills is not disputed by either plaintiff or defendant. 
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Section 59-9-6.3 provides that: 
"The Board of County Commissioners of each 
county must levy a tax on the taxable property 
of the county between the last Monday in the 
seventh month of each fiscal year and second 
Monday of the eighth month of each fiscal year 
to provide funds for county purposes .... " 
(emphasis supplied) 
Section 59-9-6.4 constitutes a recognition on the 
part of the legislature that the County Commissions are the 
proper bodies to "determine the amount" available for each 
purpose authorized by law. (emphasis supplied) 
Section 59-9-8 requires that the governing body of 
each city and town, and each board of County Commissioners, 
"must file a statement with the State Tax Commission, on or 
before the second Monday in August of each year, showing the 
amount and purpose of each levy .... " 
Section 59-9-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
imposes a statutory duty upon the State Tax Commission to 
" .•. carefully examine such statements, and, if it appears that 
any levy has been fixed in excess of the maximum amount permitte 
by law, it shall immediately notify the county attorney of the 
county in which it appears that such excess has been fixed." 
(emphasis supplied) 
A careful reading of Sections 59-9-6.3, 59-9-8 and 
59-9-9 will demonstrate that the three statutes were enacted to 
insure compliance with the maximum mill levy limitations of 
Sections 59-9-6.2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, while still le"~ 
the authority to set the levy to the county boards. 
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There is no indication in the statutes that the 
legislature intended a levy to be void because it was not set 
within the time set out in the statutes. To the contrary, 
Section 59-9-9 and Section 59-9-10, Utah Code Annotated, con-
template that a correct levy be set and enforced after the 
time prescribed in Section 59-9-6.3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
If the legislature had wanted to nullify the levy because of 
imposition after the time prescribed in Section 59-9-6.3, they 
would have included such a provision. If the time element had 
been viewed as critical by the legislature, they would not have 
passed a statute that of necessity contemplates a setting of 
the final correct levy after the time prescribed in the statute. 
It is respectfully submitted that the ruling of the 
trial court fails to give recognition to the intent on the legis-
lature with regard to the setting of a correct mill levy and 
is therefore erroneous and should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE WORD "MUST" HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY HELD TO 
BE DIRECTORY RATHER THAN MANDATORY BY THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT WHEN APPLIED TO TIME LIMITS 
INVOLVING PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTAL BODIES. 
An analysis of the several cases decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court will demonstrate that the Court has viewed words 
such as "must" and "shall" as directory rather than mandatory 
when dealing with public bodies. 
Our Supreme Court has further indicated that the 
Courts should not interfere with actions of County Commissions 
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except in extreme circumstances. In Cottonwood City Electo.£§. 
v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 499 P.2d 270 (197 2: 
the Supreme Court was called upon to review rejection by the 
Salt Lake County Commission of a petition to incorporate a town 
to be known as Cottonwood City. In addressing the legality or 
the Commission's refusal to act upon the petition of the resi-
dents of the area, our Court first indicated how questions 
involving the County and its governing body should be approached 
Justice Crockett, speaking for a unanimous Court made the follow. 
ing significant observation: 
" ... it is appropriate to have in mind certain 
foundational propositions relating to the 
County and its governing body the County 
Commission. The County is a political sub-
division of the State whose creation and 
whose powers and duties are derived from 
the constitution and statutory law. It is 
the function of the County Cornrnission~o 
govern the County as to best provide for its 
general welfare and good order, and to carry 
on the various activities and provide the 
public services usually considered to be the 
responsibility of county government. It has 
such powers as are specifically enunciated 
by law and those that are reasonably and 
necessarily implied in order to discharge 
those responsibilities. In connection there-
with it acts as the legislative body for the 
County, and also in various of its duties 
acts as the executive in administering county 
affairs. In order to discharge those responsi-
bilities in an efficient and appropriate 
manner it must necessarily be allowed a 
reasonable latitude of discretion." 499 P.2d 
at pages 271 & 272. (emphasis supplied) 
And as was further stated by Justice Crockett in the same 
case: 
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" ... the courts should not interfere with the 
actions of the Commission unless it appears 
that it acted beyond its authority, or in 
some manner which is clearly contrary to law, 
or so without basis in reason that its 
action must be deemed capricious and arbitrar 
emphasis supplied. 
II 
With the foregoing standards in mind, the Court's 
attention is now directed towards the Utah cases dealing with 
the effect of time limits contained within certain statutes and 
how the Utah Supreme Court has applied the standards. 
An early case to come before the Utah Supreme Court 
was Tanner v. Nelson, 70 Pac. 984 (1902). The case arose when 
the state superintendent of public instruction gave the required 
statutory notice that the superintendent of public instruction, 
the principal of the state normal school and county superinten-
dents would hold a convention at Salt Lake City for the purpose 
of adopting textbooks for use in the district schools of the 
state. The statute in question provided that "the convention 
shall meet and publicly open and read the proposals" for text-
books. It was contended by the appellant that the provision 
referred to above was directory and that substantial compliance 
was sufficient. The respondent argued that the statute was 
mandatory, and that the failure to read the bids as opened was 
fatal to the proceedings. In analyzing the statute in light of 
the parties' contentions, the Court observed as follows: 
"The statutory provisions which may thus be 
departed from with impunity without affecting 
the validity of the statutory proceedings are 
usually those which relate to the mode or 
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time of doing that which is essential to 
effect the aim and purpose of the legislature, 
or some incident of the essential act." 
"Where the provision is in affirmative words, 
and there are no negative words, and relates 
to the time or manner of doing the acts which 
constitute the chief purpose of the law, or 
those incidental or subsidiary thereto, by an 
official person, the provision has been usually 
treated as directory. (emphasis supplied) 
70 Pac. 984 at page 987. 
The Court then went on to uphold the actions of the public 
officials as being in substantial compliance with the purposes 
of the act. In reaching its decision the Court observed the 
following significant quotations: 
"When the statute directs an act to be done in 
a certain way at a certain time, and a direct 
compliance as to time and form does not appear 
to the judicial mind to be essential, the 
proceedings are held valid, though the command 
by the statute has been disregarded. The 
statute in such a case is said to be directory." 
"Irregularities in official action, consisting 
in the neglect or lack of strict compliance 
with statutory directions, should not be 
allowed to vitiate the proceedings taken under 
a statute, when the objects and ends of the 
statute have been substantially accomplished, 
and neither public nor private persons are 
injured by the course of proceedings." 
In the case of Wright v. Park City School District, 
133 Pac. 128 (1913), the Utah Supreme Court was reviewing an 
action brought to prohibit Park City School District from 
proceeding to levy a tax to maintain a high school separate 
and apart from the other school districts of Summit County. 
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The action claimed that the separate school could not be 
established because the board did not proceed within the sixty 
day statutory period. No action had been taken until about 
nine months after the act in question became law. The two 
statutory provisions involved provided as follows: 
Section 2: ttWithin 60 days after the approval of this act 
each county superintendent of district schools 
shall report to the board of county commissioners 
as to whether or not, in his opinion, the county 
should remain one high school district." 
Section 3: "Upon receipt of such report and recommendations 
the board of county commissioners shall set a day 
for hearing the same, which shall be not less 
than thirty days nor more tha~ sixty days from 
the day of setting .... " 
Plaintiff contended that the sixty day provisions were 
mandatory. Defendants argued the provisions were directory and 
that substantial compliance was sufficient. The Court held the 
language to be directory. The Court, in reaching its decision, 
made the following significant statements: 
"The general rule is that a statute, pre-
scribing the time within which public 
officers are required to perform an official 
act, is directory only, unless it contains 
negative words denying the exercise of the 
power after the time specified or the nature 
of the act to be performed, or the language 
used by the Legislature shows that the desig-
nation of time was intended as a limitation." 
The Court went on to cite Sutherland's treatise on Statutory 
Construction and adopted the following quotation: 
"Provisions regulating the duties of public 
officers and specifying the time for their 
performance are, in that regard, generally 
directory. Though a statute directs a thing 
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to be done at a particular time, it does not 
necessarily follow that it may not be done 
afterwards." 
"Statutes directing the mode of proceeding 
by public officers are directory, and are 
not to be regarded as essential to the 
validity of the proceedings themselves, 
unless so declared in the statutes." 
Finally, the Court observed: "There is nothing in the natun 
of the duty to be performed either by the county school super-
intendent or the board of county commissioners, under the 
statute in question that justifies the inference that the 
Legislature intended that if it were not performed within the 
time specified it should not be performed at all." In the 
instant case there is no indication that the legislature intem~ 
that no levy be set by the County if not done so by the second 
Monday in the eighth month of each fiscal year. The initial 
14.42 mill levy had been approved by the County Commission, 
certified to the Salt Lake County Auditor, approved by the Sta~ 
Tax Commission, but not reported to the Salt Lake County 
Treasurer. Thus, the mill levy process on the 14.42 mills had 
not been completed when the County Commission, realizing its 
mistake, increased the mill levy with the approval of the Tax 
Commission to 16 mills as allowed by law and thereby attempting i 
to avoid violating Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4 of the Consti-
tution of Utah, which prohibits the County from incurring debt 
in excess of expected tax receipts for the current year. 
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In Hablin v. State Board of Land, 187 P.178 (1919), 
the Utah Supreme Court was asked to interpret whether the word 
"must" in a statute requiring that an application for preference 
right to purchase school land within ninety days was mandatory 
or directory. The plaintiff had failed to file an application 
within ninety days after the survey plats had been filed in the 
United States Land Office. The State Board of Land claimed it 
could not grant the application because more than ninety days 
had elapsed since the filing of the plat. The Utah Supreme 
Court determined that the Board had the power to grant the 
application and issue a certificate of sale notwithstanding 
more than ninety days had elapsed because the word "must" as 
used in the statute was directory. 
Plaintiff-respondent, in its argument in the trial 
court cited the case of Glen v. Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P.2d 
380 (1956), as authority for the proposition that the word "must" 
is mandatory rather than directory. However, plaintiff-
responsdent fails to recognize the factual differences presented 
in that case. That case involved an attempt to attach personal 
property of a non-resident located in the State of Utah. The 
Utah attachment statute required that shares of a corporation 
"must be attached by leaving with the president, secretary, 
cashier or other managing agent thereof, a copy of the writ, 
and a notice stating that the stock or interest of defendant 
is attached .... " The plaintiff failed to serve an officer of 
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the company as required by the rule. The Court held the 
statutory procedure to be mandatory and found no compelling 
reason to view the word "must" as directory. The case is 
readily distinguishable on several grounds. First, the 
attachment was used as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction and 
the courts have been reluctant to over-look irregularities 
when extraordinary writs or proceedings are involved. In the 
instant case there is no jurisdictional problem present. The 
statute does not prohibit the Commission from setting the levy 
if the time limit has not been met. In Ferrell, plaintiff was 
an individual claiming against another individual. In the 
instant case as in the three previous cases cited herein, 
defendant is a governmental entity. The Court is required to 
take a more restrained approach when dealing with the powers of 
such governmental entities. See discussion by Justice Crockett 
in Cottonwood case. The cases previously cited and relied upoo 
by defendant all relate to time deadlines and governmental 
authority to act beyond such a deadline. The instant case 
involves the same problem. In Ferrell, there was no time 
element involved but merely the manner in which plaintiff had 
proceeded. Defendant-appellant would submit that the case of 
Glen v. Ferrell, supra, is therefore not in point. The most 
recent Utah Supreme Court decision involving time limits for 
public bodies to act clearly demonstrates that Wright v. Park 
City, supra, is still controlling in the State of Utah. 
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Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373, 393 P.2d 472 (1964) involved 
the failure of an elected public official to timely file with 
the city recorder and publish in a daily newspaper, a sworn 
statement of campaign expenses. The statute in question pro-
vided, in part, as fo~lows: 
"Every elective officer in a city of the 
first and second class shall within thirty 
days after qualifying file with the city 
recorder and publish .... " 
The Utah Supreme Court was required to determine whether the 
time limit was mandatory or directory. In determining the 
language to be directory, the Court set forth the guidelines 
to be followed in making such a determination. "The most 
fundamental one is that the court should give effect to the 
intention of the legislature." In the instant case, the legi-
slative intent was to set and insure compliance with a maximum 
mill levy limitation. That intent has not been frustrated by 
the defendant-appellant's actions herein. Next, "the court 
must analyze the statute in the light of its history and back-
ground; the purpose it was designed to accomplish; and what 
interpretation and application will best serve that purpose in 
practical operation." In the instant case the history and 
background of the statutes involved indicate that the statutes 
in question were passed to provide for an over-all levy. Its 
purpose was further to allow county legislative bodies to utilize 
county funds where needed and improve budgetary procedures in 
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accordance with the uniform accounting system passed by the 
1957 legislature, and finally, to provide a maximum over-a11 
mill levy according to assessed valuation. None of the fore-
going purposes would be frustrated by this Court's determina-
tion that the re-setting of the levy was proper. On the 
contrary, if this Court were to adopt the position of the 
plaintiff Kennecott, the intent of the legislature would be 
frustrated because it would impede the ability of the county 
legislative body i.e., the county commission, to use funds 
where needed. Salt Lake County has the statutory right to 
levy 16 mills. It has the duty to meet the needs of its 
citizens, individuals and corporate alike. It has the constit~ 
tional duty to expend only such amounts as can be anticipated 
as revenues. To adopt plaintiff's position would not only 
ignore these rights, duties and responsibilities, but do 
violence to the legislative purpose of the statutes in questi~. 
Salt Lake County has the power to levy taxes. It has the power 
to set and adopt a mill levy. It must therefore follow that 
it has the power to re-set and re-adopt a mill levy. See 
17-4-1 and 17-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. See also 
Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of Commis-
sioners, supra, at pages 271 and 272. 
Further, in the instant case the 16 mills were 
approved by the State Tax Commission of Utah. As was stated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Baker v. Tax Commission, 
520 P.2d 203 (1974): 
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"Since the commission has general supervision 
over the tax laws of the state and over those 
charged with the enforcement of the laws, and 
has the power on appeal to make such correction 
or change in the order of the county board of 
equalization as it may deem proper, it must 
necessarily follow that its authority to cancel, 
vacate or change an assessment when, upon a 
proper showing, it has been determined that 
the assessment should be so cancelled, vacated 
or changed .... " 
In the same case when the Supreme Court reviewed the 
powers of the County Commission sitting as a board of equaliza-
tion it cited the following quote with approval: 
"Power of a county board of taxation to 
"revise and correct assessment in accordance 
with the true value of the taxable property" 
necessarily includes the right to cancel the 
assessment entirely where the property is 
determined to be not taxable .... " 
520 P.2d 203 at page 206. 
The foregoing decision is a clear indication of how 
extensive the powers of the Tax Commission and County Commission 
are with respect to the assessment and collection of taxes. The 
Tax Commission had the authority to approve the increased mill 
levy in the instant case. It exercised that authority. In 
addition, the Supreme Court in the Baker case, when confronted 
with the contention that the Commission lost jurisdiction to 
hear matters after the statutory deadline made the following 
observation: 
"There is no merit to the contention that 
the Commission lost jurisdiction simply 
because these appeals from the ruling of 
the Board were not taken within five days 
after June 20, when those rulings were not 
even made until September 15." 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Tax Commission had the 
authority to approve the re-set mill levy after the time pre-
scribed in Section 59-9-6.3 and that its action in approving 
the increased levy, so long as within the maximum allowed by 
statute, should be sustained by this Court. 
POINT IV 
THE ACTION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IS FURTHER 
VALIDATED BY THE CURATIVE EFFECT OF 
SECTION 59-11-7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AS AMENDED. 
Section 59-11-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended provides as follows: 
"No assessment or act relating to assess-
ment or collection of taxes is illegal on 
account of informality or because the same 
was not corn leted within the time re uired 
by law." emphasis supplied 
Plaintiff-respondent argued that the instant case is 
not covered by the foregoing curative statute because they are 
only attacking the levy made by Salt Lake County. The trial 
court agreed. Defendant-appellant would submit that plaintiff': 
argument in this regard is totally without merit and the ruling 
of the trial court is not supported by the authorities. To 
say that the levy is not an act related to the assessment or 
collection of taxes is to completely disregard the general 
accepted meaning of that term. "To "levy" a tax means to raise 
or collect a tax - to impose or assess a tax, and collect it 
under authority of law. "Levy" is the legislative act, whether 
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state or local, which determines that a tax should be laid. 
It is the first essential to a valid tax of any description." 
72 Arn Jur 2d §704. In short, the levy is the tax that is 
assessed or charged against the property. "The word "levy" 
as applied to taxation, is given a variety of meanings. 
Strictly speaking, a levy is the legislative act, whether state 
or local, which determines that a tax shall be laid, and fixes 
its amount, and this is the meaning of the term as used in this 
chapter." §1012 Cooley on Taxation. 
"Levying a tax usually means the fixing of the rate 
at which property is to be taxed." Emeric v. Alvarado, 2 P.418. 
See also Black's Law Dictionary. Assessment on the other hand 
embraces more than simply the amount. "It includes the procedure 
on the part of the officials by which the property is listed, 
valued, and finally the proportion declared. It is said to 
include the whole statutory mode of imposing the tax, and 
embraces all the.proceedings for raising money by the exercise 
of the power of taxation from the inception to the conclusion 
of proceedings." 72 Arn Jur 2d §704. To say that the levy is 
not an act relating to the assessment or collection of taxes 
is like saying that the human body includes only the head and 
legs, but nothing between. It is respectfully submitted that 
the action taken by Salt Lake County in adopting a mill levy 
within the limits set by law was a valid act within the broad 
powers granted to such bodies. That substantial compliance 
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with the time period set for adopting the levy is sufficient 
to constitute a valid levy within the meaning of the decisiom 
of the Utah Supreme Court relating to the time within which 
public bodies must act; and, finally, that the curative statute 
enacted by the Legislature is sufficient to avoid any technic~ 
defect that might have occurred because of the adoption of t~ 
mill levy shortly after the statutory time had passed. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the tria; 
court failed to consider the intent of the legislature and 
the plain meaning and purposes of Section 59-11-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, when it granted plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and should therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit to this Honorable Court 
that the trial court erred, that under the facts and circum-
stances of this case and the law applicable thereto, the mill 
levy adopted by Salt Lake County for the year 1976, although 
re-set after the time specified by statute, was still a valid 
mill levy. That the assessments made during 1976 based upon 
said mill levy are valid. That the issues presented in the 
second action filed by plaintiff, Kennecott, were previously 
adjudicated by this Court and therefore should not have been 
re-litigated. That the decision of the trial court is 
contrary to law and not in accordance with previous decision 
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of this Court and should be reversed and judgment be entered 
for the defendant-appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
BILL THOMAS PETERS 
SPECIAL DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
220 South 200 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for defendant-appellant 
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